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Abstract
This paper researches the motivations for charitable bequests by looking at
gifts to the poor in the wills of 1357 testators who died in Suffolk, England
in the 1620’s and 1630’s.  I find that wealth, religiosity, and the presence of
family and friends influence testator generosity.  The findings that
wealthier, more religious individuals, and those with fewer children give
more to the poor support an altruistic model of testator utility.  However,
the finding that individuals who give to more people outside of their
immediate families are more likely to give to the poor contradicts the
simple altruism model. This result is shown to be consistent with a model
that suggests that charitable giving is partly driven by the approbation
friends and families grant charitable behavior.To the poor of wheresoever it shall please God to call me to him 13s 4d.  To the brother
minister who preaches a sermon 10s.  I make these 2 bequests not for any superstitious
ends for they are ever hateful to my soul, but the first I give in testimony of my faith how
ready I should have been, the Lord so enabling me, to have given to the poor in true
need.  The other I make not for any profit to me then a carcase, but for the good of my
brethern and sisters then living that they might remember their short and ensuing end. --
John Sharpe of Wickham Skeith, clerk, 1637
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By the poore therefore in this place, is understood the poore of the parish where the
Testator did dwell and keep house; for it is likely that he did beare a great affection to
the poore where he dwelled. -- Swinburne “A Breife Treatise of Testaments and Last
Wils,” 1635
I. Introduction
Charitable bequests have been and continue to be an important aspect of both
charitable giving and bequest behavior.  In the United States in 1993, individuals
bequeathed a total of $8.2 billion to philanthropic causes (U.S. Bureau of the Census
1994).  These gifts represented nearly 7% of the funds going to charitable institutions.
This paper investigates the motivations for charitable bequests by looking at giving
behavior in Stuart England. Turning to the Stuart era takes on special meaning in that it
was in this period that private charity experienced its first major spurt and many hospitals,
universities, and other institutions were first endowed.  Total charitable gifts skyrocketed
--  giving in the 1620’s and 1630’s was nearly four times as high as it was at the start of
the 1600’s.  Most of these charitable gifts were donations by testators to “the poor” of
their parish.  Because of this testator generosity, despite the existence of the Poor Lawsconfront two subjects that challenge the assumptions of simple rational economic behavior
-- bequests and charitable giving.
Bequests present a dilemma to the economist.  If utility is only a function of
consumption and is increasing in it, individuals should die with no wealth.  However, many
individuals die with  large estates.  This reality has been address by three principal
theories; the first theory suggests that bequests are accidental (Hurd 1987), the second
theory postulates that bequests are the result of exchange (Bernheim et al. 1985), and the
final theory conjectures that bequests are altruistically motivated.   Most empirical
research on bequests is concerned with testing these three motivations, in particular in
testing the altruism model.  The advantage of the altruism model is that it yields the
testable hypothesis that bequests to children should compensate for earnings differentials.
Although some research finds that bequests are at least partially compensatory (Tomes
1981), most studies find scant support for a model of altruistic bequests.   Both Menchik
(1980) and Wilhelm (1996) find that instead of being compensatory, bequests to children
are in most cases equal.  While the altruism theory receives little empirical support, the
other two theories contradict important aspects of my data.  In the first case, while people
may accidentally die with wealth, the theory offers no explanation as to why individuals
would care enough about the posthumous distribution of their goods to write a will when
will writing is neither mandatory nor costless.  Similarly, the exchange model provides no
explanation as to why individuals would make donations to as nebulous a group as “the
poor” who could offer nothing in exchange for the gifts they received.  In light of these
contradictions, I will postulate an altruistic model of testator behavior.In contrast to these other studies, I am primarily interested in the motivations for
charitable bequests.  The seventeenth century data assists in this pursuit in a number of
ways.   The data set used for this paper provides information about individuals not
available in more modern data.  Two variables are of particular interest.  First, these wills
are both wills and testaments; as such, testators bequeath their souls to God before they
divide their goods.  The testament yields valuable information on religious belief which is a
likely correlate of giving behavior.  In addition, wills were very diffuse in this period with
the average testator leaving gifts to more than four people outside of his immediate family.
2  The measure of how many other people a testator gives to provides some indication of
the size of the testator’s social circle.  An additional advantage of the seventeenth century
data is that the estates of individuals who gave money to charity were not granted special
treatment.  Therefore, I avoid the distortions caused by the tax code in the modern data.
The final advantage of investigating motivations for charitable giving using this earlier data
set is that charitable gifts were nearly always gifts to “the poor.”  Because these donations
go to individuals rather than institutions, I can easily incorporate these gifts into an
altruistic model of behavior (rather than specifying gifts as contributions to a public good
as in Amos 1982) and need not worry about differing motivations for gifts to an infinite
variety of non-profit institutions.
I specify a utility function that assumes that bequest behavior is motivated by pure
altruism.  The econometric results are evaluated based on the implications of this model.
(Unfortunately, unlike Altonji et al. (1992) the data do not yield a clear test of the altruism
model.) While many of the findings are consistent with the altruism model, the finding thatfrom the desire to receive the approval or avoid the scorn of others as is suggested by
Adam Smith (1790) and Becker (1974).  While most discussions of such approval benefits
have been largely theoretical, this paper provides some empirical support for this type of
“warm glow.”
Before developing a model of bequest behavior, I discuss the context in which this
series of wills was written.  Section II describes the condition of the testators, while
Section III discusses the state of the poor recipients of their gifts.  In Section IV, I specify
a model of altruistic testator behavior and derive the implications of the model.  The
modeling section is followed by an introduction to the wills data set and estimation of the
decision to give to the poor in Section V.  Section VI concludes.
II.  The Act of Will Writing
In primary sources from the period, will writing is viewed as a right rather than an
obligation (Swinburne 1635).  This right was restricted to men over age 14 and unmarried
women over 12.  The law of coverture restricted married women’s legal rights and their
ability to own property rendering the writing of a will both illegal and unnecessary.  An
investigation into a sample of surviving Suffolk burial records from this period suggests
that approximately half of the dying were unable to write wills.  Among the dead, 31%
were children and 18% were married women and thus unable to write a will, 14% were
unmarried women and 37% were adult males and thus able to write a will. (Suffolk
Record Office, Bury St. Edmunds 1636-1638).  Among those permitted to write wills,children.  Testators could override most aspects of inheritance law with the exception that
a widow’s right to thirds was protected.
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In the seventeenth century, will writing was part of the act of dying and often done
during an individual’s final illness once the chances of recovery were slim.  In my sample,
the mean amount of time between the writing of a will and probate was ten months and
the median amount of time was two months.   This represents an upper bound on the time
between will writing and death.   Furthermore, in one of the two sets of wills that I use,
many scribes recorded whether the testator was sick, weak, or aged.  In 53% of these
wills, the scribe detailed that the testator was in one or more of these states.  This
represents a lower bound of the percent who were ill because some scribes may not have
mentioned the health status of the testator.  In general, testators were extremely close to
death.  From this vantage point, testators were well aware of what they would have to
give away at death.  In other words, the size of their estate was known.
The majority of the population was illiterate and among the literate, only a small
fraction was able to write well enough to make a legal document such as a will.
Therefore, scribes had to be called to the bedside of a dying individual to listen to and to
record his wishes.   Those who served as scribes included clerks, rectors, surgeons, and
other learned individuals  (Spufford 1971).  In many cases, there was either not enough
time to call a scribe or not enough money to pay for the scribe’s parchment or other fees.
In these circumstances, an individual could speak his wishes to witnesses -- a will made
orally rather than in writing is called a nuncupative will.  For a nuncupative will to be
valid, two witnesses would have to repeat to the magistrate the wishes of the dying.The writing of wills served two purposes.  The secondary purpose was for a
testator to declare his religious faith and to bequeath his soul to God.  Of course, the
primary purpose was for a testator to distribute his estate.  Testators gave gifts to a
surprising range of people including children and spouses, other family members, non-
family members, pastors, servants, and the poor.  This paper looks at gifts to the poor
which were made by approximately 25% of all testators in the sample used.  When these
gifts were made, they were almost always given to “the poor” of the testator’s parish and
of other parishes where he owned land.  Most testators were probably acquainted with the
poor of their parishes because parishes were quite small with the average Suffolk parish
containing only 250 inhabitants.
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III.  The Condition of the Poor
In choosing to give to the poor of the parish, testators were reflecting the state’s
system of poor support.  To fill the vacuum in the care of the poor created by the
dissolution of the monasteries during the reign of Henry VIII, the Tudor monarchs
enacted a series of statutes culminating in the Poor Law of 1597/1601.  The law set up
overseers of the poor, mandated that they collect revenues to be distributed to the needy,
and made them responsible for setting the able-bodied poor to work and for apprenticing
poor children.  All of these collections and disbursements were to take place on the parish
level; the smallest administrative unit in the country.
Although the law mandated that parish officials tax individuals who owned land orwhen the need arose, however, the parishes aimed to support the poor without taxation.
In his study of Norfolk poor support, Wales (1984) finds the same phenomenon; large
gifts from the gentry and small voluntary contributions from others often made rating
unnecessary.  The endurance of voluntary giving even in the context of the legal provision
of taxation was explained by the overseers of Hanworth: “[I]tt beinge held fitter by our
Minister to provide for the Pore rather by voluntary contributions than by rates and
collections...” (North Walsham Overseers’ Accounts 1621-48 quoted in Wales 1984).
The need to rate may have been seen as a Christian failure.
The majority of these voluntary gifts to the poor, 63%, came in the form of
charitable bequests (Jordan 1959).  The small proportion of the population consisting of
the very rich, and particularly of the rich in the merchant class, made a large portion of
these donations.  However, less wealthy individuals also left money to the poor.  It is the
bequests of these “middle class” individuals about which this paper is concerned.  In the
sample used for this paper, I find that donations to the poor were a very small portion of
the total liquid wealth bequeathed by the middle class-- about one percent -- and an even
smaller proportion of total wealth (because of the value of lands).  However, the average
individual left a gift of £.80 to the poor when he died and the average giver left £3.3.
To evaluate the magnitude of these gifts in the context of the economy of the poor,
I turn to some research on parish level poor support disbursements.  In a study of relief in
Norfolk, Wales (1984) finds that in the first half of the 17th Century, the normal maximum
relief amount was 6d per week or £1.3 a year. Brown (1984) finds that in Aldenham,
Hertforshire in the 1670’s, a widow with two children received 6s per month or £3.6 afraction of their wealth to the poor, the small fraction they did leave was large taken in the
context of the labor market and the size of poor support disbursements.
IV.  A Model of Weighted Altruism
In much of the research on bequests, an individual determines an optimal bequest
by weighing his current consumption against the utility he gains from leaving money to his
heirs.  In contrast to this research, I assume that the size of the bequest is exogenously
determined.  This is justified by the small amount of time between will writing and death.
Another argument for the exogeneity of the bequest is that in order to write a will a
testator needs to know what he is going to distribute.  Therefore, he takes the bequest as
given when writing his will.
I assume that the dying person carefully distributes his goods because he looks on
his world altruistically with concern for the well-being of his spouse, his children, his
grandchildren, the rest of his close family, other relatives and friends, and his poor
neighbors.  I further assume that his concern for these six groups differs across but not
within them -- i.e., he cares for all his children equally.  I also assert that he views "the
poor" as a composite individual and that his intensity of feeling for them is a function of
his religiosity.  More religious testators place a higher weight on the utility of poor.  This
leads to the following utility function, subject to the budget constraint that the sum of total
bequests must not exceed the testator’s wealth:
6Ni  is the number of people in group i .
c b i i ,  are consumption prior to bequest, and bequest to group or individual i
f rel ( ) is the weight given to the utility of the poor and W i  is the weight given by
the testators to the utility of individuals in group i .
and Bis the exogenously determined size of the testator’s estate.
I make the following additional assumptions.  First, I assume that more religious
individuals give a higher weight to the utility of the poor:  ( ) ¢ > f rel 0.  Second, I assume
that the weights the testator gives to the utility of others are non-negative.  He is altruistic
rather than hateful or envious.  Third, I assume that  ( ) U c b i i + is a well-behaved utility
function with positive and declining marginal utility.  Nested in this specification is the
assumption that all individuals in each group receive the same bequest and have the same
prior consumption.  Further, the assumption that bequests and prior consumption enter
additively into the utility function implies that individuals are indifferent between
consumption financed by bequests and that financed by other sources of wealth.
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Maximizing the testator's utility subject to his budget constraint yields first order
conditions of the following form:


























Gifts are given until every recipient’s marginal utility is inversely proportional to the
weight the testator gives the recipient’s utility.
 
 The group with the higher relative weightInspecting the first order conditions leads to the implication that individuals with
lower values of  f rel ( ) , which come from lower realizations of religiosity, are expected to
give less to the poor, ceteris paribus.  Also, comparative statics on the first order
conditions and implementation of the implicit function theorem, given the assumption that
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Combined, these comparative statics yield a number of testable predictions:  bequests to
the poor are predicted to be higher for the more religious, the wealthier, the unmarried,
and for those with fewer children, grandchildren, close family members, and other relatives
and friends.
V.  Empirical Analysis of Charitable Bequests
Let your almsgiving match your means.  If you have little, do not be ashamed to give the
little you can afford  -- Tobit 4:8
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A.  The Data
In order to investigate the implications of the model, I use information from a
combination of two samples of 17th century wills:  781 wills from the Archdeaconry of
Suffolk that were proven between March 25, 1620 and March 24, 1625, and 576 willscontains some of the best land in England and was among the first areas to be enclosed.
These are the wills of the lesser gentry, yeoman, husbandmen, and laborers.  Those who
owned land in more than one archdeaconry needed to have their wills recorded and proved
elsewhere, so they are not included in the sample (Evans 1993 p. vii-viii), much of the
upper gentry was in this group.
As mentioned earlier, most wills were written by scribes.  The presence of scribes
means that written wills tended to follow a set form.  First, the name of the testator, his
occupation, parish of residence, and the day the will was written are given.  This is
followed by a religious preamble that contains a statement of faith.  Next comes the
disbursement of goods.  The section on the division of goods includes mentions of
beneficiaries, including the poor, and a description of gifts.  Finally the names and marks
of witnesses are given.  Later, the date the will was declared valid (or proven) was added.
Further, it is clear whether the will was written or nuncupative and whether the testator
was capable of signing his name in the case of a written will.  Nuncupative wills were not
as predictable in form as written wills.  These wills often lack a religious preamble and
focus exclusively on the division of chattel.
Table 1 presents the means of the variables described below for the 1357 testators.
Means are given for the whole sample and for the two Archdeaconries separately.  There
are also indicators as to whether the Suffolk and Sudbury means are significantly different
from each other.  Five kinds of variables in addition to those measuring gifts to the poor
are coded; measures of religious belief, measures of wealth, measures of numbers of
beneficiaries given gifts, measures of the circumstances of will writing, and measures ofwere for longer and original statements of faith, and fours were reserved for wills with
personalized and intense preambles.  Nuncupative wills rarely had preambles and therefore
no preamble measure is recorded for this group.  Second, a dummy variable for
the mention of God or religion in the body of the will is coded.  This includes allowances
for ministers to preach a burial sermon, other donations to men of the cloth or to the
church, and concern that children be brought up in the "fear of God."
The size of the testator’s estate or wealth is proxied for by a number of variables.
First, testator occupations are differentiated into seven occupational categories; yeoman
which includes gentlemen, skilled craft workers, shopkeepers, husbandmen, less skilled
workers, widows, and those whose occupation is missing from their will.  I do not omit
those with occupations missing because this group is not random and appears to include
both those too old and too young to work.  I assume that occupational income follows the
order listed above with yeoman as the highest income group and less skilled workers as
the lowest income group.  The income of testators in the last two categories relative to
other categories is ambiguous.  The second wealth proxy is derived from the type of will
and the nature of the signature.  I distinguish among written wills where the testator was
able to sign his name and is therefore assumed to be literate, written wills where a testator
was unable to sign his name and is therefore assumed to be illiterate, and nuncupative
wills.  Literate individuals are assumed to be wealthier than illiterate individuals.  And,
those with written wills are assumed to be wealthier than those with nuncupative wills.
The third wealth measure is a dummy variable for whether household servants are
mentioned in the will either as beneficiaries or in another context.  Having servants is alsogiven out of land; e.g., I give my son John my freehold land provided that he gives his
sister Sarah £50.  Such settlements were a standard procedure in England.  In this way,
total monetary gifts are both a proxy for land value and a sign of liquid assets.
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Measures of the numbers of people in different categories who are given gifts in
the will are also included.  A testator is coded as having a wife if a wife is mentioned in the
will.  Similarly, the number of children mentioned in the will is measured.
12  Three more
categories of people are also added; grandchildren, close family, and other relatives and
friends.  Close family consists of sons and daughters-in-law, brothers and sisters, and
parents.  Other relatives and friends consists of godchildren, more distant relatives, and
individuals whose connection to the testator is not mentioned.
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Two additional variables measure the circumstances in which the will was written.
First, I include an indication of whether the testator was in the Suffolk or Sudbury sample.
I have no a priori reason to expect that individuals in Suffolk and Sudbury would behave
differently, but include this indicator because the variable means suggest some disparities
between the two samples.  I also enter the amount of time between will writing and death
in months (and a dummy variable for when this number is missing). Those who write wills
earlier may be less likely to give to the poor because they are further from death and may
be less worried about their souls.  On the other hand, those further from death may give
more to the poor because they have more time to think about the distribution of their
estate.
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The dependent variable, bequests to the poor, has been specified in two ways; as a
dummy variable indicating whether the testator made a gift to the poor, and as a measureof the amount given to the poor.  I will focus on the results based on the presence of
giving because some testators made in-kind donations which are difficult to value.
B.  Basic Model
I propose the following specification as determining the amount of the optimal
bequest to the poor:
b religiousbelief wealth numbers of people p*= + + + + - a c d f g e circumstances
which can be rewritten:
b X p* ' = - b e
The variables are as described above and e  is a normally distributed error term. Recall
from Section IV the theoretic predictions that bequests to the poor are expected to be
higher for the more religious, the wealthier, the unmarried, and with those with fewer
children, grandchildren, family members, and others.
Although the optimal gift to the poor bp * may take on a negative value (a testator
could potentially improve his utility by taking from the poor and giving to others) he
cannot do so in his will.  Therefore, the bequest is constrained to be non-negative and the
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b' b gOne problem with the use of the tobit model is that some individuals left goods
rather than money to the poor.  These in kind gifts include fuel, food, free rent, and a
warming pan amongst others.  Although I have estimated the value of these gifts from
prices mentioned in other wills, such a task is bound to be imprecise.  Jordan had a similar
problem and notes that some gifts “defy valuation.” (Jordan 1959, p.32)  In light of this, I
am more confident in the information on whether individuals gave to the poor or not than
I am in the measure of the amount given.  Under the assumption that I only observe










where 1 represents that a gift was given to the poor.    This implies that
E Y X y X = = = Pr ' 1 F b b g .
Estimates of b can be obtained from a standard probit estimator.
The results from probit and tobit estimation are presented in Table 2.  Number of
children, total money given, and the sum of all lands are entered as splines. The probit
estimates are presented first because the problem in valuing in kind gifts implies that the
probit estimates are more reliable.  The first two columns of Table 2 present the
coefficients and standard errors from the probit estimation while the third column presents
the marginal effects from the probit model evaluated at the sample means.  The final two
columns of Table 2 present the coefficients and standard errors from the tobit model.more intense preambles were (insignificantly) more likely to give than those with intensity
two preambles while those with no preamble were less likely to make a donation.  This
correlation between religion and charity supports the assumption in the model presented
earlier that more religious individuals give more weight to the utility of the poor.
However, there are other models with which it also meshes.  For example, what if giving
to the poor were motivated by a quest for salvation?  More religious individuals might
give more to the poor because they were more concerned about their souls.  In the case of
a salvation motive, giving would no longer be viewed as altruistic, but could be captured
by traditional economic theories with testators trading off between life-time and
posthumous utility.  This notion of salvation by good works was contrary to the popular
Calvinism of this period where individuals believed that they were saved by grace rather
than by good deeds.  Notice John Sharpe’s emphatic claim in the quote that begins this
paper that he is not giving for “superstitious ends” such as salvation (Will 249, Evans
1993).  However, even if individuals were told they were saved by grace, it will never be
known whether they truly believed that death bed bequests could not help them into
heaven.  If more religious individuals care more about the poor, or if they were motivated
by salvation, approval from God or a need to demonstrate that they were in a state of
grace, this correlation between giving and religious belief would be expected.
I have assumed that the two religion variables are capturing the true religious belief
of the testator, not merely displayed religious sentiment.  The preamble variable might be
capturing either the religious sentiments of the scribe or piety feigned for the benefit of
heirs or to garner public approval.  However, the other religion variable seems immuneinduced by extra wealth tapers off significantly.  Parcels beyond three and money beyond
seventy pounds have no added effect.  Further, illiterate individuals are much less likely to
give than the literate.  Also those with spoken wills are twenty-four percent less likely to
give than literate individuals with intensity two preambles.  Combined these results
support the portrayal of the bequest as an allocation decision.  Those who have more to
allocate are more likely to give (and to give more) to the poor.  However, some of the
occupational controls do not behave as expected with most groups other than yeomen
more likely to give than skilled craft workers.  The coefficient on shopkeepers may arise
because shopkeepers were wealthier than skilled craft workers.  The coefficients on
widows may be induced by the difference between the age of testators in this group;
widows were probably older than many other testators.   Unfortunately, no record of
testator age is given in the will.  A lengthy investigation of giving patterns of men and
women (Moscow 1997) suggests that sex is not causing the widow result.
The circumstances in which the will was written also influence charitable giving
with wills written farther in advance of death more likely to include donations to the poor.
This corresponds to the theory that those with more time to think about their distribution
were more likely to include the poor.  A more unexpected result is that individuals in the
Sudbury sample, ceteris paribus, were nearly 6% more likely to give to the poor than
those in the Suffolk sample.  There are three possible explanations for this result.  The first
explanation is that the economy was different in the 1620’s (when the Suffolk testators
died) than in the 1630’s (when the Sudbury testators died) and either people were growing
richer or the poor were growing worse off.  This is unlikely because there is no record ofclimate, in unobserved wealth or in another manner.  This is difficult to resolve although it
is more likely that Suffolk had higher unobserved wealth because it was both more fertile
(Clark 1995) and has extensive coastline.
I now turn to the results on the variables tabulating numbers of people.  Both
marital status and numbers of children have the expected negative effects on giving
although the former effect is insignificant.  Notice that the spline on children suggests that
individuals with more than two children were no less likely to give to the poor than
individuals with two children.  When children are entered separately by sex, the
coefficients are negative, significant, and similar in magnitude.  In articulating a theory of
the distribution of bequests, the clearest prediction is that the presence of children should
dampen gifts to the poor.  For example, in the exchange model, additional children
increase the opportunities for exchange and therefore decrease the need for exchange
outside the family.  With this in mind, the magnitude of the effect of having additional
children on giving is surprisingly small.
One potential factor influencing the effect of additional children on giving is the
fact that I have not accounted for inter-vivos transfers.  Such transfers were fairly
common and both sons and daughters were often given gifts at marriage or on reaching
their majority.  If most giving to children was inter-vivos, those with children would have
lower bequeathable wealth which would in turn lower their gifts to the poor.  But, because
I am controlling for bequeathable wealth in these regressions, if this were the case, I
would find little direct effect of number of children on charitable giving.  In addition, if
children received inter-vivos gifts, the consumption of children prior to bequest wouldapprenticed.  I re-run the probit estimator for the 419 testators with minor children.  The
results are quite different from expected.  In this regression, both including and excluding
the spline, children have a smaller and insignificant effect on giving to the poor.  This
suggests that inter-vivos transfers to children do not explain the small magnitude of the
effect of children on giving.  The drop in the magnitude of the effect of having children on
giving for those with minor children probably arises because all 419 individuals in this sub-
sample have at least one child and much of the negative effect of children on giving arises
from the difference between having no children and having at least one.
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The effects of the number of people in the three other groups of people --
grandchildren, close family, and other people are all positive.  The first and last of these
are significant in the tobit model while the first is borderline insignificant and the last is
significant in the probit model.  Close family consists 58% of siblings, 7% of parents and
35% of children in law.  When these three are entered separately in the regression, none
has a significant effect.  Others consists 9% of godchildren, 43% of distant relatives, and
48% of those whose relationship to the testator is not mentioned.  When these three are
entered separately all three are significant in the probit model while only the "no
relationship given" variable is significant in the tobit model.  In both models, the "no
relationship given" variable is significant at the 1% level.  These results imply that testators
who are more likely to give to individuals outside their immediate family are more likely to
give to the poor.
These are the only results that conflict with the predictions of the altruism model
presented earlier.  This conflict arises because according to the altruism model, gifts toresult is spurious and that there is an omitted variable that is causing some individuals to
give more to both these others and to the poor.
The result that people with more grandchildren give more to the poor could easily
be explained by age.  Although this cannot be tested because of the lack of age data, it
corresponds well to the result for widows reporter earlier. Further, modern estimates of
giving find that the oldest individuals are the most likely to give (Auten and Joulfaian
1996).  In contrast, the positive effects of godchildren, distant relatives, and others defy
easy justification.
The first possible explanation for the positive coefficients on close family and
others assumes that having more people mentioned in a will causes increased giving to the
poor.  The most likely explanation for why having more godchildren, distant relatives, and
others would cause increased giving to the poor is that testators with more friends and
distant relatives in their lives have more people to impress in their wills.  One clear way to
impress these people is to make a charitable contribution.  Swinburne (1635) discusses the
legal advantages given to charitable giving in wills and makes clear the general societal
approval of bequests to the poor.  Therefore, people may give to the poor in order to gain
the approval or approbation of others and to be remembered as a sympathetic and
charitable person.  Such a search for approval is suggested in Adam Smith’s Theory of
Moral Sentiments (Smith 1790 see III.2.6) to be one of man’s primary motivations.
Were people motivated by a search for admiration from their friends and relatives,
individuals with more friends and relatives in their lives, and thus in their wills, would be
more likely to do good deeds.  One way to model such a decision would follow from aconsisting of those for whom no relationship to the testator is given is the most powerful
and significant of these results.  This is consistent with a belief that testators care most
about the opinion of those most distant from them, or about the opinion of society.  It is
also consistent with the idea that those who are most distant have the least other relevant
information about an individual's character and may therefore be most influenced by public
displays of charity.
The second possible explanation for the positive coefficients on grandchildren,
close family, and others, is that there is some omitted variable that increases these three
measures of people and also increases giving to the poor.  What is contained in the error
term?  What besides wealth, religion, and family structure may influence charitable
behavior and would also influence the number of people mentioned in a testator’s will?  I
believe one missing variable is a measure of testator philanthropy -- the testator’s love for
mankind.  Some people’s hearts simply bleed more than other people’s.  Testators who are
more philanthropic would care more about the poor and be more likely to give to them.
At the same time, testators who were more philanthropic would also care about a wider
circle of people in general which would extend not only to the poor, but also to friends,
distant relatives, and others.  Such an omitted measure which I label “individual
philanthropy” or “wideness of circle” could explain the correlation between charitable
giving and the numbers of grandchildren, close family members, and others given to.  This
definition of philanthropy differs from altruism in the following way.  Altruism assumes
that all testators distribute their assets because they care about others and that all testators
distinguish among these different groups of people in the same way.  Philanthropy assumesmeasure, the correlation in Table 2 is spurious, the numbers of people are correlated with
the error term and should be instrumented for.
Another reason to be concerned about the possible endogenity of grandchildren,
close family, and others is that the numbers in these groups may be choice variables.  For
instance, whereas the number of children and marital status are exogenous, the testator
chooses whether to include other individuals.  However, if these numbers of people are
choice variables, the predictions of their effects presented in Table 2 are biased down
because the theory that suggests that those who care more about other people would give
less to the poor likewise implies that people who care more about the poor would give less
to other people.  Because of both this and the “wideness of circle” argument, I seek to
instrument for other people in the regressions.  The wills themselves offer no possible
instruments because there is nothing contained in the will that is exogenous to the
distribution decision.  Therefore, I seek data on the testator’s parish of residence as a
potential source for instruments.
C.  Parish Fixed Effects
Before discussing potential parish level instruments, I turn to the question of
whether there are parish level fixed effects influencing the decision to give to the poor.
The question at issue is whether there are unobserved attributes of parishes or individuals
in them that influence the probability of giving on the part of all people from the same
parish.  The most likely source of such fixed effects would be the condition or number of
poor in the parish or the attitudes of parish civic or religious leaders towards the poor.the sample from their parish, and all variables which do not vary across individuals -- in
this case the constant and the Sudbury dummy variable.  (Greene 1993)  For parsimony, I
also drop the splines on children, money and lands.  I also omit individuals who will not be
able to be matched to parish level instruments in the next part of the paper.  Finally, for
computational feasibility, I drop all individuals in parishes from which there are more than
nine individuals. This leaves a sample of  907 individuals from 262 different parishes.  The
variable means for this subsample as well as the results from a Chamberlain fixed effects
logit are presented in Table 3.
The significance levels are similar to those in Table 2 as are the signs of the effects.
The only variables to exhibit a large change are the preamble variables.   This is most likely
the result of the fact that the same scribe wrote many wills within a parish and probably
suggested similar preambles in all the wills (see Spufford 1971 and Alsop 1989).
Therefore, there may be less variation in preambles within a parish then across parishes.
This suggests that the results on the preamble variable in Table 2 are driven by across
parish variation.  The decline of the preamble variable does not lead to the conclusion that
religion did not influence giving because the “other religion” variable remains positive and
significant and this second religion variable is probably a more valid measure of religiosity.
Finally, I conduct a Hausman test comparing the fixed effect model to a simple
logit.  The test fails to reject the original model (without fixed effects).
17  Therefore, I
assume there are no parish level fixed effects determining giving to the poor and turn to
the search for parish level instruments.dependence on their neighbors and friends for goods and services.  Alternately, individuals
living in more urban areas may have a larger spectrum of friends.
I find four instruments that are both relevant (correlated with the grandchildren,
close family, and other people variables) and exogenous (uncorrelated with the error of
the regression determining charitable giving) from the parish data set collected by Greg
Clark for his project on the reports of the Charity Commission in England (Clark 1995).
The first instrument is parish population in 1801, the second is parish land area in 1841.
18
The other two instruments are both distance variables.  The first one is the distance from
the parish to the nearest market town in 1600.  The second is the distance to the nearest
major population center in 1600, where the two population centers are Ipswich and Bury
St. Edmunds.  Ipswich and Bury St. Edmunds were the two largest cities in Suffolk both
in 1801 and in the 17th Century.
Testators from my data set were matched to data from Clark’s data set by the
parish given in their will.  In 1261 cases, individuals were successfully matched.
19  Those
who were not matched either did not have a parish mentioned in their will, mentioned a
parish that does not exist in the Clark data set, or mentioned a parish with an incomplete
set of information.  These 1261 testators do not differ in any significant way from the
larger sample.  The means for the four instruments for the 1261 matched testators are
presented at the bottom of Table 1.
In order to allow for the possibility that grandchildren, close family, and other
people are endogenous, I add a second reduced form equation that correlates these









 is observed.   X1 is a subset of exogenous variables measuring
testator wealth, religious belief, marital status, number of children, and circumstance.   N
is a vector of endogenous variables consisting of number of grandchildren, number of
close family members, and number of others given gifts in the will.   X is a set of
exogenous variables including those in  X1 and the four instruments measuring community
characteristics -- parish population, parish land area, distance to market 1600, and distance
to population center in 1600.  e  and m  are normally distributed errors.
This system of equations states that the decision to give to the poor is determined
as before while the numbers of people to give to are determined by the variables
determining giving to the poor as well as by the four measures of community
characteristics.
A model that combines endogeneity with a binary choice can be estimated using
the two stage conditional maximum likelihood estimator (2SCMLE) developed by Rivers
and Vuong (1988, for another example of the use of this estimator see Costa 1995).  The
model is calculated in the following way:  First regress the endogenous variables on the
exogenous variables including the parish level instruments.  Then perform a probit by
regressing the binary variable (in this case the giving dummy) on the exogenous variables
excluding the instruments and on the residuals from the first stage regressions.  This
process gives estimates that are strongly consistent and asymptotically normal.
20  The
results from using the 2SCMLE estimator are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
21  Table 4The first stage regression demonstrates that the numbers of people testators give
to are related to a number of the exogenous variables.  In addition, the instruments
perform well -- at least one is significant in each of the three regressions.  The second
stage probit yields interesting results.  The marginal effects from the 2SCMLE model are
very close to those from the original probit (although the significance levels are lower in
the 2SCMLE, as in most instrumental variables estimates) with some important
exceptions; the marginal effects of having a wife decreases and the  marginal effect of
having children becomes positive.  Also, the marginal effect of each additional grandchild
and each additional close family member become negative and insignificant while the
marginal effect of each additional other person becomes more positive and insignificant.
The 2SCMLE model has an additional advantage in that a Wald test for the
exogeneity of the first stage dependent variables is whether the coefficients on the first
stage residuals in the second stage equation are equal to zero.  I am unable to reject joint
exogeneity of these three variables.  I even fail to reject the that the coefficients do not
equal zero at the 80 percent level.  When I test the three variables separately, I similarly
find that exogeneity cannot be rejected.  Combined these results suggest that endogeneity
was not causing the positive coefficients on close family, grandchildren, and others in the
original probit.  Therefore, the characteristic which I label “wideness of circle” or
“individual philanthropy” does not seem to increase both gifts to the poor and gifts to
others.
The failure to reject exogeneity implies that I cannot reject that the original model
and the positive coefficients on grandchildren, close family, and others were correct.  ThisBefore concluding that the data suggest that religious, altruistic, and selfish
motivations influence giving to the poor, I question the role of selection bias in these
results.
E. Selection Bias
As noted earlier, only about twenty-five percent of those legally permitted to leave
wills chose to do so.  In light of this, it is important to question whether selection
influences the results reported above and to investigate the decision to write a will.  The
reasons for dying intestate were probably quite complex, but two main rationales arise.
First, because will writing was largely a death bed activity, the circumstances of death
probably had quite a large influence on the ability to leave a will.  Those who died quickly
or accidentally were most likely intestate unless they were in the minority who planned in
advance for death.  These differences between method of death were probably quite
random, or at least unrelated to the decision to give to the poor and thus would not
influence the results presented above.  The second and more important probable rationale
for dying intestate was a general acceptance of the estate division that would arise without
a will.  This was likely to be influenced by two factors; first by family situation which
would determine the result of the application of inheritance law and second by wealth
because those with small estates were unlikely to be able to gain enough by altering
distribution to rationalize the expense or trouble of a will.  Because both family structure
and wealth also influence giving to the poor, selection based on these factors couldthe chattel (Erickson 1995). These inventories provide detailed information about both the
price of specific items and the overall value of chattel.  In addition to inventories, there are
estate administrations which report who was given control of the division of the estate of
intestates.  This position was analogous to the role of executor in the case of testators.
Very few inventories have survived for Suffolk or Sudbury from the 1620s and
1630s.  However, inventories have survived from other periods in the 17th Century.  To
look at the will writing decision, I use the complete set of 168 inventories from Suffolk in
1685. (Suffolk Record Office, Ipswich 1685b).  These inventories report the total value of
chattel.  In addition, I am able to link the inventories to the index of Suffolk wills and
administrations (Grimwade et al. 1980).  From this linkage, I can determine whether an
individual left a will or not.  Furthermore, from the wills and administrations, I can
determine whether an individual was married at the time of death (Suffolk Record Office,
Ipswich 1685a and 1685c).  For will writers, I mark an individual as married if he
mentioned a wife in his will (as above).  For the intestate, I mark an individual as married
if administration was granted to the “relict” or widow of the deceased.  For married
testators, inheritance law automatically gave the widow the right to administration.
Variable means for the full sample and for testate and intestate individuals separately are
presented in Table 6a.
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Table 6b presents the results of probit estimation of the will writing decision.  Both
inventory value (as fraction of median inventory value among will writers) and marital
status have significant effects on the probability of writing a will.  Notice that these two
factors explain  44% of the variation in the will writing decision.given variable (as a fraction of the median amount given by will writers) coded from the
1357 wills.  I then evaluate the CDF of a standard normal at this number.  Because
inventory value is not recorded in the wills, I use the total monetary gifts because it is the
most similar variable that can be determined from the wills.  I divide inventory value and
monetary gifts by the median among will writers to put both variables on as similar a scale
as possible.
Having calculated these propensity scores, I use two different tests to check
whether selection may be influencing the results.  First, I add the propensity score as an
independent variable in the regressions predicting gifts to the poor.  Under the null
hypothesis that selection does not matter, this score should have no effect on giving. 
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The coefficient on the propensity score is insignificant in both the original probit and the
endogeneity corrected model (both t-statistics are around 0.6).  Therefore I fail to reject
the null.  As a second test, I divide the sample by propensity score and only look at the
group with scores above two-thirds.  These individuals are less likely to be influenced by
selection.  (The remaining 638 testators have a median propensity score of  84%.)  The
results for this subsample correspond well to those for the whole sample.  In particular, in
the original probit other people, grandchildren and family are positive and other people is
significant as are the wealth and religion variables.  In the 2SCMLE, grandchildren, close
family and others maintain their signs and continue to be insignificant.  I also still fail to
reject the exogeneity of these three variables.  The results of these two tests suggest that
selection bias is not influencing these results.of testator utility.  However, the finding that individuals who give to a greater number of
individuals outside their immediate family are more likely to give to the poor contradicts
the simple altruism model.  Upon further investigation, I discover that I cannot reject that
having more grandchildren, close family members and others to mention in a will causes
increased charitable giving.  This finding suggests that individuals may be motivated by a
quest for approbation from distant relatives and friends when writing their wills.
VI.  Implications
The wills used in this paper suggest that in addition to altruism, testators may also
be motivated by the desire to garner the approval and approbation of others, particularly
non-relatives, when deciding how to divide their estates.  This is suggested by the
powerful impact of the numbers of individuals beyond the immediate family mentioned in
the will on giving behavior.  This finding is consistent with Andreoni (1989, 1990), Adam
Smith (1790), Becker (1974) and others who suggest that individuals gain a benefit from
giving beyond that arising from the increased utility of recipients.  Andreoni labels this
benefit the “warm glow” of giving.
This research suggests that one way to model the warm glow is as a halo effect.
Perhaps it is not that individuals derive utility from the act of giving, but rather that they
derive utility from being perceived of as a generous, compassionate, and philanthropic
individual.  In the case of wills, individuals give to charity in order to influence how they
will be remembered.  The notion that individuals give in part to influence how they will besmall legacy of 3s 4d to Nicholas his eldest son, and so here declares the reasons for it.
The gifts he had formerly given Nicholas, and the money he gained by dealing under his
father, raised £100 for him.  His father would otherwise have given him £95, and thought
it good to have this endorsed on his will to prevent bad and undeserved censures.” (Evans
1993, Will 463).  John Reeve is obviously quite concerned about how others perceive of
him after his death and is well aware of the public nature of his distribution decision.
  The importance of appearances to testators may also offer an explanation for the
preponderance of equal division in modern wills.  In his study using the Estate-Income
Tax Match data, Wilhelm (1996) found that 76.6% of estates were divided within 2% of
exact equality.  While seventeenth century testators give to charity in part to look
charitable, modern testators may divide equally in order to look fair.  This would occur if
fairness to children, like gifts to charity, is an approved of behavior.  The notion that equal
division was approved of in the seventeenth century also is demonstrated by both John
Reeve who feels compelled to explain his treatment of Nicholas and by John Clark who
gives his four children equal portions except that his “eldest son John, because he is lame,
shall have £4 more than the rest.” (Evans 1993, Will 329)Bibliography
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Descriptive Statistics
Full Sample Suffolk Sample Sudbury Sample
1357 Obs 781 Obs 576 Obs
1620-1624 1636-1638
Variable                                                                       Mean     Std. Dev.             Mean     Std.Dev                Mean     Std.Dev
Amount of Gift to Poor (£) .802 4.505 .759 4.977 .861
3.775
Dummy=1 if Gift to Poor .242 .429 .233 .423 .255 .436
Dummy=1 if No Religious Preamble .028 .165 .027 .162 .030 .169
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 1 .171 .377 .159 .366 .188 .391
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 2*** .438 .496 .357 .479 .549 .498
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 3*** .175 .380 .245 .430 .080 .271
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 4*** .055 .229 .072 .258 .033 .179
Dummy=1 if Religion Outside of Preamble .107 .309 .115 .320 .095 .294
Dummy=1 if Yeoman .303 .460 .293 .456 .316 .465
Dummy=1 if Skilled Craft Worker** .141 .349 .123 .329 .167 .373
Dummy=1 if Shopkeeper .040 .196 .044 .204 .035 .183
Dummy=1 if Husbandman .091 .287 .088 .284 .094
.292
Dummy=1 if Less Skilled Worker .032 .177 .028 .166 .038 .192
Dummy=1 if Widow .166 .372 .160 .367 .174 .379
Dummy=1 if No Occupation Given*** .227 .419 .264 .441 .177 .382
Dummy=1 if Could Sign Written Will*** .382 .456 .449 .498 .290 .454
Dummy=1 if Could Not Sign Written Will*** .486 .500 .410 .492 .589 .493
Dummy=1 if Will is Spoken (Nuncupative) .133 .339 .141 .348 .122 .327
Dummy=1 if Servants in Household .087 .282 .092 .290 .080 .271
Total Amount of Money Bequeathed (£) 73.889 164.498 73.063 157.641 75.008 173.497
Number of Parcels of Land Bequeathed* 1.419 2.511 1.521 2.795 1.280 2.058
Number of Houses Bequeathed* 1.105 1.700 1.181 1.915 1.002 1.351
Dummy=1 if Married .560 .497 .558 .497 .563 .497
Number of Children** 2.499 2.307 2.371 2.207 2.672 2.426Notes: The symbols *,**, and *** indicate that the means for Suffolk and Sudbury are different from each other at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.  Time between will and probate is only calculated in 731 cases in Suffolk and 562 cases in
Sudbury where time between will writing and probate is known.  Parish variables are only calculated in 746 cases in Suffolk
and 515 cases in Sudbury where parish is known.Table 2:
Probit and Tobit Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Probit Model    Tobit Model
1357 Observations            1357 Observations
   Dependent Variable:             Dependent Variable:
Dummy=1 if Gift to Poor             Amount of Gift to Poor (£)
Mean=.242   Std.Dev.=.429     Mean=.802  Std.Dev.=4.505
Variable                                                                       Est.            Std. Err.      Marg. Effect            Est.                      Std.Err
Intercept -1.388***  .213 -.349 -12.481***
1.761
Dummy=1 if No Religious Preamble -1.344*** .434 -.338 -8.620*** 3.330
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 1 -.127    .128 -.032 -.827 1.036
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 3 .009 .126 .002 -.160 .960
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 4 .300 .189 .075 1.795 1.352
Dummy=1 if Religion Outside of Preamble .868*** .137 .218 4.329*** .951
Dummy=1 if Yeoman .528*** .157 .133 3.057** 1.297
Dummy=1 if Shopkeeper .476* .255 .120 2.023 2.032
Dummy=1 if Husbandman -.153 .243 -.039 -1.500
2.054
Dummy=1 if Less Skilled Worker .380 .292 .096 2.004 2.400
Dummy=1 if Widow .351*  .199 .088 2.325 1.628
Dummy=1 if No Occupation Given .165 .173 .042 2.176 1.409
Dummy=1 if Could Not Sign Written Will -.363*** .102 -.091 -2.343***
.795
Dummy=1 if Will is Spoken (Nuncupative) -.967*** .239 -.243 -7.412***
2.009
Dummy=1 if Servants in Household .770*** .151 .194 3.457*** 1.026
Total Amount of Money Bequeathed (£) .007*** .002 .002 .053*** .016
Spline at Money Bequeathed Equals 70£ -.007*** .002 -.002 .044***
.016
Number of Parcels of Land Bequeathed .111** .052 .028 .664* .390
Spline at Land Bequeathed Equals 3 Parcels -.100 .065 -.025 -.482 .436
Number of Houses Bequeathed .064 .040 .016 .340 .263Restricted Log-Likelihood -751.620
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Notes: The omitted dummies are Religious Preamble Intensity 2, Literate, and skilled craft workers.  Because the
Nuncupative wills lack preambles, the coefficient for the nuncupative variable is a comparison with a literate individual with
an intensity two preamble.  Marginal effects in the probate are evaluated at the sample means.  The symbols *,**, and ***
indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.Table 3:
Chamberlain Fixed Effects Logit
(Parish Level Fixed Effects)
907 Observations
Dependent Variable:  Giving Dummy
Mean= .249    St.Dev=.433
Variable                                                                                     Est.                       Std. Err.                             Variable Mean
Dummy=1 if No Religious Preamble -2.786 3.236 .018
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 1 -.133 .433 .154
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 3 -.577 .390 .186
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 4 .041 .706 .058
Dummy=1 if Religion Outside of Preamble .825* .461 .114
Dummy=1 if Yeoman 1.301** .511 .332
Dummy=1 if Shopkeeper 1.123 .881 .028
Dummy=1 if Husbandman -.306 .721 .101
Dummy=1 if Less Skilled Worker .739 1.160 .032
Dummy=1 if Widow .886* .614 .159
Dummy=1 if No Occupation Given .328 .573 .213
Dummy=1 if Could Not Sign Written Will -.935** .366 .482
Dummy=1 if Will is Spoken (Nuncupative) -1.703** .849 .127
Dummy=1 if Servants in Household 1.622*** .510 .094
Total Amount of Money Bequeathed (£) .005*** .002 74.559
Number of Parcels of Land Bequeathed .150 .104 1.526
Number of Houses Bequeathed -.001 .138 1.157
Dummy=1 if Married .177 .387 .583
Number of Children -.140* .078 2.534
Number of Grandchildren .113** .055 1.226
Number of Other Close Family Members .195 .127 .793Table 4:
First State Regression of Two Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Regression of Endogenous Variables on Exogenous Variables Including Instruments
Grandchildren Close Family Members Other People
Mean=1.109    St.Dev=2.685        Mean=.799   St.Dev=1.462  Mean=2.327
St.Dev=5.147
           1261 Observations            1261 Observations        1261 Observations
Variable                                                                       Est.          Std. Err.              Est.        Std.Err.                Est.        Std.Err
Intercept -.637* .352 1.543***.221
3.676***.577
Dummy=1 if No Religious Preamble -.279 .346 -.108 .268 .103 .927
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 1 -.549***.184 -.097 .092 .249 .368
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 3 -.319 .203 -.271***.095 .220 .356
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 4 .557 .420 -.162 .180 .187 .507
Dummy=1 if Religion Outside of Preamble .409 .345 .221 .150 1.069** .485
Dummy=1 if Yeoman .441** .193 -.149 .104 .160 .336
Dummy=1 if Shopkeeper .269 .369 .054 .187 .131 .482
Dummy=1 if Husbandman -.194 .174 -.068 .111 .281
.324
Dummy=1 if Less Skilled Worker -.259 .235 .068 .195 -.687* .388
Dummy=1 if Widow   1.374***.318 -.384***.129 .719 .525
Dummy=1 if No Occupation Given -.059 .175 .266** .123 .697* .373
Dummy=1 if Could Not Sign Written Will .475*** .160 -.161* .082 .575** .271
Dummy=1 if Will is Spoken (Nuncupative) -.084 .196 -.644***.123 -1.491***.397
Dummy=1 if Servants in Household .474 .313 .008 .153 1.563** .612
Total Amount of Money Bequeathed (£) .014***.003 .012***.002 .044*** .006
Spline at Money Bequeathed Equals 70£ -.014***.004 -.011***.002 -.042***.007
Number of Parcels of Land Bequeathed -.080 .081 .022 .044 -.133 .147
Spline at Land Bequeathed Equals 3 Parcels .042 .090 -.029 .052 .175 .181
Number of Houses Bequeathed .034 .061 .063* .036 .099 .131
Dummy=1 if Married -.741***.181 -.720***.096 -1.336***.297
Number of Children .546*** .084 -.404***.051 -2.381***.190Notes: The omitted dummies are Religious Preamble Intensity 2, Literate, and skilled craft workers.  Because the
Nuncupative wills lack preambles, the coefficient for the nuncupative variable is a comparison with a literate individual with
an intensity two preamble.  Marginal effects in the probit are evaluated at the sample means.  The symbols *,**, and ***
indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.Table 5:
Second State Regression of Two Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Regression of Giving Dummy on Exogenous Variables Excluding Instruments and First Stage Errors
Dependent Variable:  Giving Dummy
Mean=.246  Std. Error=.431
     1261 Observations
Variable                                                                                     Est.                       Std. Err.               Marg. Effect        
Intercept -1.442 .974 -.367
Dummy=1 if No Religious Preamble -1.456** .714 -.371
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 1 -.320 .432 -.081
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 3 -.265 .550 -.067
Dummy=1 if Religious Preamble Intensity 4 .237 .314 .060
Dummy=1 if Religion Outside of Preamble .813*** .240 .207
Dummy=1 if Yeoman .442 .269 .113
Dummy=1 if Shopkeeper .576 .357 .147
Dummy=1 if Husbandman -.290 .389 -.074
Dummy=1 if Less Skilled Worker .535 .333 .136
Dummy=1 if Widow   .167 .611 .043
Dummy=1 if No Occupation Given .117 .132 .030
Dummy=1 if Could Not Sign Written Will -.459* .274 -.117
Dummy=1 if Will is Spoken (Nuncupative) -.995*** .304 -.254
Dummy=1 if Servants in Household .518  .481 .132
Total Amount of Money Bequeathed (£) .007 .010 .002
Spline at Money Bequeathed Equals 70£ -.007 .010 -.002
Number of Parcels of Land Bequeathed .132** .060 .034
Spline at Land Bequeathed Equals 3 Parcels -.149 .110 -.038
Number of Houses Bequeathed .083 .071 .021
Dummy=1 if Married -.346 .885 -.088
Number of Children .115 .691 .029
Spline at Children Equals 2 -.131 .655 -.033
Number of Grandchildren -.112 .614 -.029
Number of Other Close Family Members -.415 1.133 -.106
Number of Other People .232 .351 .059indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.   Standard errors
are created by bootstrapping.Table 6a:
Descriptive Statistic from Probate Inventories, 1686
Full Sample Intestate Testator
168 Observations 60 Observations 108 Observations
Variable                                                         Mean     St.Dev.                 Mean     St.Dev                  Mean     St.Dev
Dummy=1 if Individual Wrote a Will*** .643 .481 .000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Dummy=1 If Individual Was Married* .560 .498 .650 .481 .509 .502
Inventory Value As a Fraction of Median**  1.593 2.282 1.023 1.342 1.909 2.617
Value Among Will Writers
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Notes: The symbols *,**, and *** indicate that the means for intestate individuals and testators are different from each other
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 6b:
Results from Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Dependent Variable:  Dummy for Will Writing
Mean=.643   St.Dev=.481
168 Observations
Variable                                                                       Est.        Std.Error             Marginal Effect                 
Intercept .390** .168         .143
Dummy=1 If Individual Was Married -.477** .212         -.175
Inventory Value As a Fraction of Median  .182*** .070         .067
Value Among Will Writers
Pseudo R-Squared .437
Log-Likelihood -103.210
Adjusted Log-Likelihood -109.495